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The get_client_master_key function in s2_srvr.c in the SSLv2 implementation in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a accepts a nonzero CLIENT-MASTER-KEY CLEAR-KEY-LENGTH value for an arbitrary cipher, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to determine the MASTER-KEY value and decrypt TLS ciphertext data by leveraging a Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle, a related issue to CVE-2016-0800.
The get_client_master_key function in s2_srvr.c in the SSLv2 implementation in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a accepts a nonzero CLIENT-MASTER-KEY CLEAR-KEY-LENGTH value for an arbitrary cipher, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to determine the MASTER-KEY value and decrypt TLS ciphertext data by leveraging a Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle, a related issue to CVE-2016-0800. This vulnerability involves weaknesses in
This medium-severity vulnerability could be exploited under certain conditions to compromise security controls or access sensitive information. Should be addressed in a timely manner.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days · more likely than 92.5% of all CVEs.
Isolate affected systems from untrusted networks until patching is complete
Implement enhanced monitoring for exploitation attempts and unusual behavior