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Affected versions of this crate would call Vec::set_len on an uninitialized vector with user-provided type parameter, in an interface of the HDR image format decoder. They would then also call other code that could panic before initializing all instances.
This could run Drop implementations on uninitialized types, equivalent to use-after-free, and allow an attacker arbitrary code execution.
Two different fixes were applied. It is possible to conserve the interface by ensuring proper initialization before calling Vec::set_len. Drop is no longer called in case of panic, though.
Starting from version 0.22, a breaking change to the interface requires callers to pre-allocate the output buffer and pass a mutable slice instead, avoiding all unsafe code.
Affected versions of this crate would call Vec::set_len on an uninitialized vector with user-provided type parameter, in an interface of the HDR image format decoder. They would then also call other code that could panic before initializing all instances.
This could run Drop implementations on uninitialized types, equivalent to use-after-free, and allow an attacker arbitrary code execution.
Two different fixes were applied. It is possible to conserve the interface by ensuring proper initialization before calling Vec::set_len. Drop is no longer called in case of panic, though.
Starting from version 0.22, a breaking change to the interface requires callers to pre-allocate the output buffer and pass a mutable slice instead, avoiding all unsafe code.
This critical vulnerability poses an immediate and severe threat to system security. Exploitation could lead to complete system compromise, data breach, or denial of service. Immediate action is required.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days · more likely than 84.1% of all CVEs.
Apply security patches to version 0.21.3 immediately
Isolate affected systems from untrusted networks until patching is complete
Implement enhanced monitoring for exploitation attempts and unusual behavior