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httpTokenCacheKey uses path.Base to extract the expected HTTP-01 token value to lookup in the DirCache implementation. On Windows, path.Base acts differently to filepath.Base, since Windows uses a different path separator (\ vs. /), allowing a user to provide a relative path, i.e. .well-known/acme-challenge/....\asd becomes ....\asd. The extracted path is then suffixed with +http-01, joined with the cache directory, and opened. Since the controlled path is suffixed with +http-01 before opening, the impact of this is significantly limited, since it only allows reading arbitrary files on the system if and only if they have this suffix.
httpTokenCacheKey uses path.Base to extract the expected HTTP-01 token value to lookup in the DirCache implementation. On Windows, path.Base acts differently to filepath.Base, since Windows uses a different path separator (\ vs. /), allowing a user to provide a relative path, i.e. .well-known/acme-challenge/....\asd becomes ....\asd. The extracted path is then suffixed with +http-01, joined with the cache directory, and opened. Since the controlled path is suffixed with +http-01 before opening, the impact of this is significantly limited, since it only allows reading arbitrary files on the system if and only if they have this suffix.
This high-severity vulnerability could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or compromise data integrity. Prompt remediation is strongly recommended.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days · more likely than 49.0% of all CVEs.
Apply security patches to version 0.0.0-20220525230936-793ad666bf5e immediately
Isolate affected systems from untrusted networks until patching is complete
Implement enhanced monitoring for exploitation attempts and unusual behavior