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InlineVec::clear() and SerVec::clear() in rkyv were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call drop_in_place on each, updating self.len only after the loop. If an element's Drop implementation panics during the loop, self.len is left at its original value.
A subsequent invocation of clear() on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:
InlineVec::clear() is called again from InlineVec's own Drop implementation when the value is later dropped.SerVec::clear() is called again by SerVec::with_capacity() after the user closure returns.Box<T>DropBoth vulnerabilities are triggerable entirely from safe Rust via std::panic::catch_unwind and require no special privileges.
InlineVec::clear() and SerVec::clear() in rkyv were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call drop_in_place on each, updating self.len only after the loop. If an element's Drop implementation panics during the loop, self.len is left at its original value.
A subsequent invocation of clear() on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:
InlineVec::clear() is called again from InlineVec's own Drop implementation when the value is later dropped.SerVec::clear() is called again by SerVec::with_capacity() after the user closure returns.Box<T>DropBoth vulnerabilities are triggerable entirely from safe Rust via std::panic::catch_unwind and require no special privileges.
This medium-severity vulnerability could be exploited under certain conditions to compromise security controls or access sensitive information. Should be addressed in a timely manner.
Apply security patches to version 0.8.16 immediately
Isolate affected systems from untrusted networks until patching is complete
Implement enhanced monitoring for exploitation attempts and unusual behavior