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| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Advisory ID | SGZ-2026-31040 |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| CWE | CWE-776 |
| Confidence | 90% |
| Category | logic_flaw |
| Exploitability | likely |
| Package | binding@latest (golang) |
| Location | binding/xml.go:22-26 |
| Attack Vector | NETWORK |
| Attack Complexity | LOW |
| Privileges Required | NONE |
| Discovered By | SafeGuard Zero-Day AI Discovery Engine |
The xmlBinding decoder uses encoding/xml.NewDecoder without disabling entity expansion or imposing size limits. An attacker can supply a malicious XML payload with deeply nested entity definitions, causing exponential memory and CPU consumption (Billion Laughs attack). This leads to denial of service as the decoder will process the expanded entities during Decode.
The vulnerability was identified in the file binding/xml.go at lines 22-26 within the binding package (version latest). Any code path that invokes these functions inherits this vulnerability.
File: binding/xml.go (lines 22-26)
decoder := xml.NewDecoder(r)
if err := decoder.Decode(obj); err != nil {
The code above demonstrates the vulnerable pattern. This code is executed at runtime and can be directly exploited by an attacker with the appropriate access level.
Send a crafted XML payload containing nested entity definitions (e.g., <!ENTITY lol "lol"> with recursive expansions) to the endpoint that uses xmlBinding. The decoder will expand entities exponentially, exhausting resources and causing the service to hang or crash.
Denial of Service – the service becomes unresponsive or crashes due to resource exhaustion.
Configure the XML decoder to disable entity processing and limit the size of the input. For example, set decoder.Strict = true and use a custom Entity map that rejects external entities, or switch to a safe XML parsing library that enforces size limits.
Advisory: SGZ-2026-31040 | Source: SafeGuard Zero-Day AI Discovery | Status: Candidate
This vulnerability was autonomously discovered by SafeGuard's AI-powered Zero-Day Discovery engine using TAOR (Think-Act-Observe-Repeat) agentic analysis on the package source code. It is not yet tracked in any public vulnerability database (CVE, NVD, GHSA, OSV). This finding should be triaged by a security engineer and, if confirmed, reported upstream to the package maintainer.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Advisory ID | SGZ-2026-31040 |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| CWE | CWE-776 |
| Confidence | 90% |
| Category | logic_flaw |
| Exploitability | likely |
| Package | binding@latest (golang) |
| Location | binding/xml.go:22-26 |
| Attack Vector | NETWORK |
| Attack Complexity | LOW |
| Privileges Required | NONE |
| Discovered By | SafeGuard Zero-Day AI Discovery Engine |
The xmlBinding decoder uses encoding/xml.NewDecoder without disabling entity expansion or imposing size limits. An attacker can supply a malicious XML payload with deeply nested entity definitions, causing exponential memory and CPU consumption (Billion Laughs attack). This leads to denial of service as the decoder will process the expanded entities during Decode.
The vulnerability was identified in the file binding/xml.go at lines 22-26 within the binding package (version latest). Any code path that invokes these functions inherits this vulnerability.
File: binding/xml.go (lines 22-26)
decoder := xml.NewDecoder(r)
if err := decoder.Decode(obj); err != nil {
The code above demonstrates the vulnerable pattern. This code is executed at runtime and can be directly exploited by an attacker with the appropriate access level.
Send a crafted XML payload containing nested entity definitions (e.g., <!ENTITY lol "lol"> with recursive expansions) to the endpoint that uses xmlBinding. The decoder will expand entities exponentially, exhausting resources and causing the service to hang or crash.
Denial of Service – the service becomes unresponsive or crashes due to resource exhaustion.
Configure the XML decoder to disable entity processing and limit the size of the input. For example, set decoder.Strict = true and use a custom Entity map that rejects external entities, or switch to a safe XML parsing library that enforces size limits.
Advisory: SGZ-2026-31040 | Source: SafeGuard Zero-Day AI Discovery | Status: Candidate
This vulnerability was autonomously discovered by SafeGuard's AI-powered Zero-Day Discovery engine using TAOR (Think-Act-Observe-Repeat) agentic analysis on the package source code. It is not yet tracked in any public vulnerability database (CVE, NVD, GHSA, OSV). This finding should be triaged by a security engineer and, if confirmed, reported upstream to the package maintainer. This vulnerability involves weaknesses in
This medium-severity vulnerability could be exploited under certain conditions to compromise security controls or access sensitive information. Should be addressed in a timely manner.
Isolate affected systems from untrusted networks until patching is complete
Implement enhanced monitoring for exploitation attempts and unusual behavior