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Home/ATT&CK/T1036/T1036.005
MITRE ATT&CK Sub-Technique

T1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

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Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: `svchost.exe`). Alternatively, a Windows Registry key may be given a close approximation to a key used by a legitimate program. In containerized environments, a threat actor may create a resource in a trusted namespace or one that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster.(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Backdoor 2023)

Tactics
Stealth
Platforms
Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows

▪Parent technique

T1036: Masquerading

▪Mitigations (3)

M1022Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files. Enforce Least Privilege Permissions: - Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles. Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs. Harden File Shares: - Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows. Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access. On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf` File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): - Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions. Audit File System Access: - Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities. Restrict Startup Directories: - Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`. Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`. - On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`.

M1038Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Application Control: - Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution. - Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.xml"`) Script Blocking: - Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources. - Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g., `Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned`) Executable Blocking: - Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as `%TEMP%` or `%APPDATA%` directories. - Implementation: Block execution of `.exe`, `.bat`, or `.ps1` files from user-writable directories. Dynamic Analysis Prevention: - Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time. - Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.

M1045Code Signing

Code Signing is a security process that ensures the authenticity and integrity of software by digitally signing executables, scripts, and other code artifacts. It prevents untrusted or malicious code from executing by verifying the digital signatures against trusted sources. Code signing protects against tampering, impersonation, and distribution of unauthorized or malicious software, forming a critical defense against supply chain and software exploitation attacks. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforce Signed Code Execution: - Implementation: Configure operating systems (e.g., Windows with AppLocker or Linux with Secure Boot) to allow only signed code to execute. - Use Case: Prevent the execution of malicious PowerShell scripts by requiring all scripts to be signed with a trusted certificate. Vendor-Signed Driver Enforcement: - Implementation: Enable kernel-mode code signing to ensure that only drivers signed by trusted vendors can be loaded. - Use Case: A malicious driver attempting to modify system memory fails to load because it lacks a valid signature. Certificate Revocation Management: - Implementation: Use Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to block certificates associated with compromised or deprecated code. - Use Case: A compromised certificate used to sign a malicious update is revoked, preventing further execution of the software. Third-Party Software Verification: - Implementation: Require software from external vendors to be signed with valid certificates before deployment. - Use Case: An organization only deploys signed and verified third-party software to prevent supply chain attacks. Script Integrity in CI/CD Pipelines: - Implementation: Integrate code signing into CI/CD pipelines to sign and verify code artifacts before production release. - Use Case: A software company ensures that all production builds are signed, preventing tampered builds from reaching customers. **Key Components of Code Signing** - Digital Signature Verification: Verifies the authenticity of code by ensuring it was signed by a trusted entity. - Certificate Management: Uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to manage signing certificates and revocation lists. - Enforced Policy for Unsigned Code: Prevents the execution of unsigned or untrusted binaries and scripts. - Hash Integrity Check: Confirms that code has not been altered since signing by comparing cryptographic hashes.

▪Used by groups (61)

G0004Ke3changG0006APT1G0007APT28G0008CarbanakG0010TurlaG0012DarkhotelG0016APT29G0018admin@338G0019NaikonG0032Lazarus GroupG0033Poseidon GroupG0034Sandworm TeamG0040PatchworkG0045menuPassG0046FIN7G0047Gamaredon GroupG0049OilRigG0050APT32G0054SowbugG0056PROMETHIUMG0059Magic HoundG0060BRONZE BUTLERG0069MuddyWaterG0081Tropic TrooperG0087APT39G0090WIRTEG0091SilenceG0094KimsukyG0095MacheteG0096APT41G0099APT-C-36G0106RockeG0107WhiteflyG0108Blue MockingbirdG0114ChimeraG0117Fox KittenG0119Indrik SpiderG0121SidewinderG0129Mustang PandaG0134Transparent TribeG0135BackdoorDiplomacyG0137Ferocious KittenG0139TeamTNTG0143Aquatic PandaG1003Ember BearG1006Earth LuscaG1008SideCopyG1014LuminousMothG1016FIN13G1017Volt TyphoonG1018TA2541G1020Mustard TempestG1022ToddyCatG1023APT5G1024AkiraG1032INC RansomG1039RedCurlG1044APT42G1046Storm-1811G1047Velvet AntG1055VOID MANTICORE

▪Software using this technique (140)

S0013PlugXmalwareS0015IxeshemalwareS0058SslMMmalwareS0070HTTPBrowsermalwareS0072OwaAuthmalwareS0081ElisemalwareS0083MisdatmalwareS0084Mis-TypemalwareS0085S-TypemalwareS0086ZLibmalwareS0125RemsecmalwareS0128BADNEWSmalwareS0136USBStealermalwareS0138OLDBAITmalwareS0141Winnti for WindowsmalwareS0144ChChesmalwareS0171FelismusmalwareS0182FinFishermalwareS0187DaserfmalwareS0188StarloadermalwareS0196PUNCHBUGGYmalwareS0198NETWIREmalwareS0259InnaputRATmalwareS0260InvisiMolemalwareS0268BisonalmalwareS0269QUADAGENTmalwareS0274CalistomalwareS0334DarkCometmalwareS0340OctopusmalwareS0353NOKKImalwareS0356KONNImalwareS0386UrsnifmalwareS0395LightNeuronmalwareS0402OSX/ShlayermalwareS0409MachetemalwareS0410FysbismalwareS0445ShimRatReportertoolS0446RyukmalwareS0455MetamorfomalwareS0458RamsaymalwareS0459MechaFloundermalwareS0468SkidmapmalwareS0475BackConfigmalwareS0477GoopymalwareS0482BundloremalwareS0483IcedIDmalwareS0484CarberpmalwareS0491StrongPitymalwareS0493GoldenSpymalwareS0495RDATmalwareS0496REvilmalwareS0500MCMDtoolS0501PipeMonmalwareS0520BLINDINGCANmalwareS0526KGH_SPYmalwareS0531GrandoreiromalwareS0533SLOTHFULMEDIAmalwareS0534BazarmalwareS0559SUNBURSTmalwareS0560TEARDROPmalwareS0562SUNSPOTmalwareS0565RaindropmalwareS0567DtrackmalwareS0578SUPERNOVAmalwareS0582LookBackmalwareS0583PysamalwareS0586TAINTEDSCRIBEmalwareS0587PenquinmalwareS0588GoldMaxmalwareS0589SibotmalwareS0595ThiefQuestmalwareS0600DokimalwareS0605EKANSmalwareS0606Bad RabbitmalwareS0622AppleSeedmalwareS0625CubamalwareS0629RainyDaymalwareS0630NebulaemalwareS0631ChaesmalwareS0652MarkiRATmalwareS0661FoggyWebmalwareS0665ThreatNeedlemalwareS0666GelsemiummalwareS0668TinyTurlamalwareS0669KOCTOPUSmalwareS0687Cyclops BlinkmalwareS0690Green LambertmalwareS0694DRATzarusmalwareS0697HermeticWipermalwareS0698HermeticWizardmalwareS1011TarraskmalwareS1014DanBotmalwareS1017OutSteelmalwareS1018Saint BotmalwareS1019SharkmalwareS1022IceApplemalwareS1032PyDCryptmalwareS1034StrifeWatermalwareS1035Small SievemalwareS1039BumblebeemalwareS1041ChinoxymalwareS1042SUGARDUMPmalwareS1046PowGoopmalwareS1050PcSharetoolS1063Brute Ratel C4toolS1070Black BastamalwareS1074ANDROMEDAmalwareS1078RotaJakiromalwareS1084QUIETEXITmalwareS1090NightClubmalwareS1099SamuraimalwareS1100NinjamalwareS1124SocGholishmalwareS1153Cuckoo StealermalwareS1158DUSTPANmalwareS1160LatrodectusmalwareS1182MagicRATmalwareS1183StrelaStealermalwareS1196Troll StealermalwareS1197GoBearmalwareS1201TRANSLATEXTmalwareS1203J-magicmalwareS1217VIRTUALPITAmalwareS1228PUBLOADmalwareS1236CLAIMLOADERmalwareS1237CANONSTAGERmalwareS1238STATICPLUGINmalwareS1239TONESHELLmalwareS1242QilinmalwareS1248XORIndex LoadermalwareS1249HexEval LoadermalwareS9008Shai-HuludmalwareS9015BRICKSTORMmalwareS9019PureCryptermalwareS9030SameCoinmalwareS9031AshTagmalwareS9033FoodermalwareS9034Tsundere BotnetmalwareS9035LAMEHUGmalwareS9037RustyWatermalware

▪Reference

T1036.005on MITRE ATT&CK

MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.